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IV

'' ^ "N DICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to I Jtah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(a), Utah Code Ann. § o.Mw.-.- i • .u,*-. , ,.m . w,i, \mi. § 78- 2a

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues and standard of appellate review are satisfactorily presented in
Petitioner's brief Workers Compensation Kind ^ui;i,,n.> ;,u, .,uui L>u.v.iv m response to
Petitiunei \ aij-'iinn'iil Ikil Woikus ('omp. r^ = »'•.

,
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portion of Ms. Wood's permanent partial impairment and medical expenses.

DETERMINATIVE I, AW
Utah Code Ann. § 34A • 2 • 412(6)(c)(ii):
Permanent partial disability compensationh may not be paid for any
permanent impairment that existed prior to an industrial accident.
F< jft Cock \ I I I I . § 3 4 \ - - 1 10?P)

.-, ,eci u> ihe limitations proviocu m mis uiapiu aim umess otllerwise
noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, and
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act, are incorporated into
this chapter and shall be applied to occupational disease claims.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable v>ccupational disease
1

means any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of
employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that
employment.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108(2)(b):
The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first
suffered disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the
occupational disease was caused by employment..
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105:
See Appendix B
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110:
See Appendix B
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the case, course of proceedings and relevant facts are satisfactorily set
forth in Petitioner's brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) concurs in Bryner Clinic / IHC Risk
Management's (BC/IHC) argument that the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted
and applied Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-3-110(1) to the facts of this case. The Labor
Commission did not err, however, in holding BC/IHC solely liable for workers
compensation benefits attributable to Ms. Wood's occupational exposure to latex while
employed at the Bryner Clinic.
2

ARGUMEN I
Utah law places the entire workers compensation liability for an
occupational disease on the entity insuring the employer during the
injured worker's "last injurious exposure" to the hazards of the
disease. IHC Risk Management continuously insured Ms. Wood's
employer (Bryner Clinic) during the last three years of her harmful
occupational exposure to latex. Did the Commission eii in holding
BC7IHC solely responsible for workers compensation benefits
jfi? ^-iiiiibSr Jo Ms. Woods latex induced medical conditions?
B( "IIM " ""otifeitds, lh;it VVC T" should he ir't|!ii!'nl h> p;iy a pioportionatr shun
of the workers compensation benefits awarded to Ms. Woods for her exposure to
latex while employed at the Bryner Clinic since \XC¥ insured Bryner Clinic
.w.:iig uio

11»\o years a-M 'i-, e n\onu\:, )i . .:-.

\ • silk-, The I 'iimmissum

. • <*\h

* J *'• • . •'•:-.-':f«.nn and held BC/IHC solely liable for the benefits.

This result is clearly mandated by Utah law.
in l\icijic Employers Ins, Co. v. Industrial i .ommisswn of Utah, llie Utah
Supreme ( 'ourt held ihaf the "Insl injurious e,\posiiM,p ink jpphes lo occupational
disease cases involving a single employer with multiple insurance carriers. The
court determined that the carrier insuring the risk at the time of the injured
:
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workers compensation benefits payable as a result of the disease. The Labui
Commission has followed Pacific Employers in assigning liability in similar
sit uations

\ s i loted ii 1 the ( xxi 1:11 nission's Oi de i :>ri I1 lotion for R eviev* in tl 1 z

instant case, the only exception to the "last injurious exposure" rule is found in
1

157 P.2d 800 (Utah 1945)
Ballatore v. Buehner Block, Labor Comm'n. Case No. 02-0124 (5-18-04) in Appendix B.

Utah Code Ann. §34-3-105 which provides for apportionment of liability where
the last injurious exposure is less than twelve months in duration.3 The
Commission correctly observed that the facts of this case cause it to fall squarely
within the coverage of the general rule, rather than the exception. Ms. Wood was
last exposed to latex for nearly three years while IHC provided the Bryner Clinic's
workers compensation insurance.4
BC/IHC argues that Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412(6)(c)(ii) by operation of
Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-102 prohibits the Commission from requiring it to pay
compensation for the permanent impairment attributable to Ms. Wood's latex
exposure at the Bryner Clinic prior to IHC's coverage period.5 This argument,
however, confounds the distinction between a workers compensation occupational
disease claim and one that arises from an industrial accident. The legislature has
purposefully chosen to apply different legal principles to injuries caused by
singular events (accidents) and those brought on by gradual, sustained exposures
to harmful agents over the process of time (occupational diseases). Hence the
reason for two separate statutes: The Workers Compensation Act and the
Occupational Disease Act.

J

Order on Motion for Review, pp. 3 - 4 . See Appendix A.
Recoid, at 141.
^ Brief of Appellants, p. 17
6
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 et. seq. and 34A-3-101 et. seq. respectively.

4

4

The reasons for this differentiation are clear. Once an accident has
occurred, there is no compelling reason, either of substance or procedure, to
relieve the employer/carrier of liability for the ongoing effects of that accident
upon the injured party. A subsequent accident does not necessarily break the
causal connection between an injured worker's current medical condition and the
earlier accident. Impairment arising from the prior event can be evaluated at any
time after the event and attributed to it because a medical record exists, or can be
constructed, from the time of the occurrence forward.
Occupational diseases are substantively different. In many cases, as in this
one, an employer and/or its insurer "presides" over a period of exposure to a
harmful substance or workplace condition, but is not the employer or carrier when
the disease finally appears and gives rise to disability, impairment and the need for
medical treatment. When the disease is discovered, and if additional harmful
exposure has occurred after the "departure" of the earlier employer or insurer, it is
impossible to know if there was an actual injury at the time the previous
employment or coverage ended. No medical records would exist documenting the
nature and extent of an injury at that moment in time. Thus, by definition, Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-412(6)(c)(ii) cannot apply. Prior to the actual manifestation
of the disease, there is no impairment. In the instant case, the medical panel
apportioned Ms. Wood's impairment on the basis of causal factors. Nowhere in

7

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co V Industrial Comm }n, 657 P 2d 764 (Utah 1983)

5

its report, however, did the panel ever state that any of that impairment actually
existed prior to the time that Ms. Wood's disease became symptomatic in 1997. 8
As noted in BC/IHC's brief,9 some states have made attempts to apportion
liability for occupational diseases among employers or sureties based on exposure
periods. As noted, however, that is not the law in Utah,10 nor is it in most other
jurisdictions.

l

The substantive difference between industrial accidents and

occupational diseases gives rise to the need for a different means of administering
occupational disease claims. Professor Larson observes:
The last injurious exposure rule is particularly useful for allocating
liability in occupational disease cases, which often involve a
multitude of insurers.... [The] initial task of discovering even the
names of all of the insurers at risk during the claimant's working life
might consume months of the Board's time before it could even
begin to assess the proportion of exposure that occurred while each
insurer was at risk.12
Succinctly stated, sequential industrial accidents give rise to two or more,
distinct causes of action. Sequential harmful exposures, on the other hand, give
rise to only one cause of action.

1^

The insurer affording coverage at the time that

one cause of action arises is the only insurer liable for the benefits payable by
reason of the occupational disease.14

Thus, the flaw in BC/IHC's argument is

that it does not distinguish between the multiple causes of action that arise from
8

Recoid, pp. 61-77
Buef of Appellants, p 8
10
Subject to the one exception piovided foi m Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-105(2)
11
Laison's lists 19 states that have lecogmzed some foim of apportionment to modify the application of the
last injurious exposure rule See Laison, Larson 's Workei 's Compensation D153-81 to 87 (2004)
12
Larson, § 153 02[5] at 153-10.
b
When the disease becomes known and disabling See Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-108(2)(b)
14
See Utah Code Ann § 34A-3-105(1) As noted above, subsection (2) does not apply to this case

9

6

sequential industrial accidents and the single cause of action that arises from
injurious exposures spanning the coverage periods of multiple insurers and/or
employers.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, WCF respectfully asks the Court of Appeals to
uphold the Utah Labor Commission's order requiring Bryner Clinic and/or IHC
Risk Management to be solely responsible for the permanent partial disability
compensation and medical benefits attributable to Ms. Wood's occupational
disease. WCF does agree with BC/IHC that the Commission's impairment rating
calculations should be corrected to conform to the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. §34A-3-110.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2005.
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND

&U

/<.'^

Elliot K. Morris
Attorney for Respondent Workers
Compensation Fund
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APPENDIX A

Utah Labor Commission:
• Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, June 21, 2004
• Order on Motion for Review, February
14,2005

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

KAREN S WOOD,
Petitioner,

J

M 21 2004]

Workers Cf^D^smv^«Leg*/ Departnen*

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

vs.
IHC BRYNER CLINIC, IHC RISK
MANAGEMENT, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUND,
Respondent

Case No. 20011138
Judge Sharon J Eblen

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner filed an application for hearing on November 2, 2001 seeking the
payment of occupational disease benefits for latex allergy as a result of exposure to
latex in the course and scope of her employment with IHC Bryner Clinic for the period
from September 1992 to December 1997. A hearing was scheduled for October 18,
2002, but on October 17, 2002, the parties requested that they be allowed to submit
stipulated facts for a direct medical panel referral. Accordingly, on the request of the
parties, the hearing in this matter was canceled.
The parties submitted a Fact Stipulation for a direct medical panel referral on
December 11, 2002. However, the fact stipulation failed to detail the petitioner specific
job duties and the manner in which she was exposed latex in her employment and
private life. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted the additional information requested
by the administrative law judge on March 26, 2003. On May 19, 2003, respondent
submitted a letter agreeing to the exposure information submitted by the petitioner in
March 26, 2003, but added additional information about the petitioner's use of latex and
non latex gloves in her employment with respondents. On July 22, 2003, the petitioner
notified the commission that she did not object to the additional information provided in
Respondents letter dated May 16, 2003.
The administrative law judge prepared supplemental facts based upon the
information provided by the parties on September 10, 2003. This matter was forwarded
to a medical panel appointed by the Labor Commission on September 10, 2003. On
January 20, 2004, the medical panel report was received by the commission and
forwarded to the parties on January 20, 2004. Petitioner filed an objection to the
medical panel report that was received by the commission on February 9, 2004.

-

Wood v. Bryner Clinic
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order
Page 2 of 2

STIPULATED FACTS
1. Petitioner was born on November 12, 1962. Her social security number is 004-749550. At the time of the alleged occupational disease, the claimant was married and
had four children under the age of 18.
2. Petitioner was hired to work for the Bryner Clinic on September 1 1992, as a medical
lab technician. Petitioner's shifts regularly lasted eight hours per day, working
approximately five days each week. At the time of the alleged occupational disease,
she was earning wages of approximately $428.40 per week. She was married and had
four dependent children.
3. On about October 31, 2001, petitioner filed an occupational disease claim, alleging
that she sustained a latex allergy as a result of the exposure to latex in the course of per
employment with the Bryner Clinic from the period of September 1992 through
December 1997.
4. From January 1 1991 through January 16,1995, the Bryner clinic was insured by the
Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah.
5. Since January 16, 1995, Bryner Clinic has been self insured with claims managed by
IHC Risk Management.
6. The Employers First Report of Injury states that petitioner sustained an injury or
illness on September 2,1997 at approximately 12:45 p.m. when she had an allergic
reaction when inhaling latex allergens. The Employers First Report of Injury also states
that she notified Bryner Clinic of her latex allergy on May 20, 1997.
7. Petitioner smoked for made 17 (1979) through 1982. She smoked again from 1992
to 1997. She smoked again from 1998 to 1999. She began smoking again in 2001, but
is no longer smoking. She has never smoked more than half a pack daily.
8. The course of medical treatment and petitioner's medical history are contained in the
medical records. The 62 page medical records exhibit prepared IHC Risk Management
(referred herein as " IHC's M R E "), and the 339 page medical records exhibit prepared
by the Workers1 Compensation Fund (referred herein as " WCF's M R E "), should be
admitted into evidence. There is some duplication between the medical records.
9. In accordance with the recent request of the Labor Commission for chronological
summary as of medical records, attached as Exhibit A is a chronological summary of
the medical records submitted by Mr. Chai Citations to records (column labeled " PG ")
contained in the IHC M R E are included in the summary. Records without a page
number referred to records found only in the WCF's M R E. The parties do not stipulate
that this chronological summary is evidence in this case. Rather it is submitted so that
the administrative law judge is able to better locate the medical records and place them
in some chronological context.

Wood v. Bryner Clinic
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10. Petitioner seeks the following benefits:
a. She is entitled to a 44% permanent partial impairment rating for her respiratory
system and skin caused by or are (sic) directly related to her exposure to latex at the
Bryner Clinic from September 1992 through December 1997.
b. On going medical care for her respiratory system and skin caused by or are
(SIC) directly related to her exposure to latex at the Bryner Clinic from September 1992
through December 1997.
Petitioner does not claim benefits for any unpaid temporary disability benefits. Nor does
she claim that any prior medical expenses related to her claims remain unpaid.
11. Respondents denies (sic) that they are liable for any permanent partial impairment
rating. Respondents also denied that they remains (sic) responsible for ongoing
medical care.
12. The parties agree that the medical evidence is controverted thus requiring a direct
medical panel referral on the medical issues in this case.
13. The parties waive their rights to an evidentiary hearing (but not any medical panel
hearing).
14. In medical panel should determine:
a. What permanent impairment, if any, petitioner has for her latex exposure
while working for Bryner Clinic? Any permanent partial impairment fish identified
specifically and apportion as appropriate to contributing factors unrelated to her work for
Bryner Clinic, her work at Bryner Clinic from September 1992 to January 16,1995
(during coverage of WCF's) and; her work at Bryner Clinic from January 16, 1995
through December 1997 (during coverage under IHC Risk Management).
b. if your medical care, if any, petitioner requires for her latex exposure while
working for Bryner Clinic? Any future medical care should be identified specifically and
apportioned as appropriate to contributing factors unrelated to her work for Bryner
Clinic, her work at Bryner clinic from September 1992 to January 16, 1995 (during
coverage of WCF) and; her work at Bryner Clinic from January 16, 1995 through
December 1997 (during coverage under a IHC Risk Management).
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS
15. The parties submitted stipulated facts on December 11, 2002. On February 18,
2003, the administrative law judge requested that the parties provide additional
information describing the petitioner's job duties, including how she was exposed latex
in her employment and any exposures outside the employment. The parties submitted
the supplemental information in letter form and all parties either specifically agreed that
the additional information was correct or provided no response contesting the additional
information. Accordingly, the administrative law judge sets forth herein the additional
facts 15 through 22, provided by the parties in this matter:

Wood v. Bryner Clinic
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order
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16. While Karen Wood was employed with the Bryner Clinic from September 1992 to
December 1997, she consistently worked in four separate areas of the clinic. For each
we have provided a basic description of her job duties and the exposure to latex that
occurred while performing that job.
17.
a. Upstairs Laboratory: Ms. Wood was required to draw blood from patients and
the basic testing such as urinalysis, hematocrits and blood sugars. She usually work
between 16 to 24 hours a week in the upstairs lab and would go through between 20
and 40 pair of latex gloves per day. She was exposed latex by both wearing, taking on
and taking off her gloves, as well as being exposed to the latex from other individuals
doing the same sort of tasks and there were usually two to four people working in the
upstairs lab.
b. Hematology: Ms. Wood processed blood for CBC's, sedimentary testing
requiring pipetting and red blood smears. Ms. Wood wore between eight to 25 pair of
gloves a day in this department and spent between 8 and 16 hours a week in
hematology. There were usually four to seven people working in the downstairs labs
which included hematology, chemistry and the special chemistry area.
c. Chemistry. Ms. Wood processed blood for routine chemistry panels. She
used between two to weight pair of gloves a day in this area and spent about eight
hours per week performing such tasks.
d. Special Chemistry Area: Ms. Wood processed many different chemistry tests
quite relation studies, and and in studies and was required to wear gloves while she
was performing such tests. As her hours in this area ranged from 0 to 8 a week, the
number of gloves that she would be required to wear would vary.
18. Ms. Wood's exposure to latex was by both wearing the gloves herself and by having
the latex particulates in the air when she would put on or remove a pair of gloves. She
was also in close proximity to between two and seven other co-workers who were also
performing the same types of tasks and putting latex particulates in the air by putting on
and taking off gloves in the same work area.
19. Ms. Wood's latex exposure outside of work was the same as any other average
person and was not exposed to any significant latex presence outside of work.
20. Ms. Wood used latex gloves with cornstarch powder until September 1997.
21. Ms. Wood began using non latex gloves in September 1997.
22. The clinic stopped using cornstarch powdered latex gloves near the end of 1997.
23. The petitionees application for hearing indicates that she worked for first medical
care in Union City, Georgia from April 1985 to August 1991. The application for hearing
indicates that the petitioner worked for clinical laboratories in Cheyenne, Wyoming from
August 1991 to August 1992. The application for hearing indicates that the petitioner
worked for I H C Bryner Clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah from September 1992 to
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December 1997. To the application for hearing indicates that the petitioner worked for
Cheyenne radiology in Cheyenne Wyoming from April 1998 to August 2001.
24. The petitioner's average weekly wage was $428.40. This translates to a weekly
compensation rate of $285.61. She was married with four dependent children under the
age of 18, which adds $25 per week to the compensation rate for a total of $311 per
week rounded to the nearest dollar. However, the maximum compensation rate for
permanent partial disability compensation in December 1997 was $310 per week.
25. The petitioner was medically stable or at maximum medical improvement on
February 27, 1998 .
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Utah applies the last injurious exposure rule to insurance carriers. Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 157 P. 2 d 800 (Utah 1945);
Ballatore vs. Buehner Block et a / . , L C Case No. 02-0124, 5/18/04.
Utah Code Section 34 A-3-110 provides:
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and
limited to the proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the
occupational disease were the sole cause of disability or death, as the
occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of
disability or death when the occupational disease, or any part of the
disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not
subject to commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial
exposure outside of employment or to which the general public is
commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable;
or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an
occupational disease.
ANALYSIS
The parties submitted stipulated facts for direct medical panel referral regarding
the extent of the petitioner's permanent partial impairment and the relative causal
contributions of occupational and non-occupational factors to her latex allergy. The
medical panel appointed a medical panel to review the medical aspects of this case.
Although the parties failed to include specific information about the petitioner's
exposures to latex in employment prior to her employment with Bryner Clinic, the
medical panel took a medical and occupational history from the petitioner as part of the
medical panel's evaluation of this case. The medical panel noted that the petitioner
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began working in the medical field on the military in 1981. She worked for Med First
Humana Primecare as a laboratory and X-ray technician from 1983 to 1989 on in
Georgia; and from 1990 to 1991 in Cheyenne, Wyoming as a laboratory worker.
Accordingly, the medical panel noted that the petitioner was exposed to latex for 5 of
her 15 occupational latex exposure years in Utah.
Utah's Occupational Disease Act, Section 34A-3-110, provides for apportionment
of benefits based upon the relative occupational and non-occupational causal
contributions. Under Pacific Employers, the last insurance carrier during the
employment that was the last injurious exposure is responsible pay all compensation
and medical expenses attributable to the compensable occupational exposure under the
Utah Occupational Disease Act. However, the act provides that the Utah employer is
only responsible to pay compensation that is causally related to the Utah employment.
The evidence in the record shows of the petitioner worked five years in Utah in
employment that causally contributed to the onset of her latex allergy symptoms.
Accordingly, the Utah employer, Bryner Clinic is responsible to pay one-third of the
occupationally-related condition. The medical panel opined that the petitioner's
pulmonary condition was 70 percent related to her employment and 30% related to nonindustrial allergies, including exposures to latex outside of employment, and her genetic
predisposition to allergy. The medical panel noted that the petitioner is allergic to some
environmental allergens as well as some foods in addition to her allergy to latex.
The medical panel concluded that the petitioner has 11% permanent partial
impairment attributable to her pulmonary and skin conditions. The medical panel
attributed 70 percent of this impairment to the petitioner's latex allergy, yielding an 8%
whole person permanent partial impairment due to latex allergy. The panel went on to
apportion 90 percent of the petitioner's latex allergy to her industrial exposures and 10%
to non-occupational factors. This yields a permanent partial impairment of 7.2% whole
person attributable to the petitioner's industrial latex allergy.
The medical panel then proceeded to apportion causation for the petitioner's five
years of Utah employment latex exposures from her 15 year overall employment
exposure to latex. The petitioner's Utah employment contributed one-third of the
petitioner's total occupational exposure to latex. Thus, the petitioner's Utah employment
exposures to latex contributed a 2.4% permanent impairment (7.2 x 33.3% = 2.397% ).
Under Pacific Employers, the responsibility for the entire Utah employment related
permanent partial impairment lies with IHC Risk Management, the last insurance carrier
during petitioner's harmful exposure.
The medical panel calculated the percentage of Bryner Clinic's share of future
medical expenses for the industrial contribution to petitioner's latex allergy. However,
under Pacific Employers, the responsibility for payment for the causal contribution of
petitioner's Utah employment to her future medical care lies with the last insurance
carrier, IHC Risk Management.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The petitioner's Utah employment contributed one-third to the petitioner's
permanent partial impairment and future medical care for her occupational^ caused
latex allergy. The responsibility to pay the contribution for petitioner's Utah
employment-related occupational disease lies with the last insurance carrier for Bryner
Clinic during petitioner's injurious exposure, IHC Risk Management.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and IHC Risk Management
shall pay the petitioner, Karen S. Wood, permanent partial disability compensation for a
2.4% permanent impairment or 7.49 weeks at the rate of $310 per week for a total of
$2,321.90, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from February 28, 1998.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and I. H. C. Risk Management
shall pay one-third of the medical expenses necessary to treat petitioner's industrial
latex allergy in accordance with the relative value schedule of the Labor Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner Clinic and IHC Risk Management shall
pay James E. Seaman, Attorney at Law an attorney's fee in the amount of $464.38, plus
20 percent of the interest generated on the above award, for his services to the
petitioner in this matter. Said attorneys' fees shall be deducted from the above award
and remitted directly to the office of James E Seaman, Attorney at Law.
DATED THIS A |

day of ^\lAyuJi

2004.

UTAH LABOR COMM

^U^yn /t

CAfxJsl^

Sharon J Eblen
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their
responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for
Review or its response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on June 21, 2004, to the persons/parties at the
following addresses:
Karen S Wood
Box 313
Hancock ME 04640
Die Bryner Clinic
745 E 300 S
Salt Lake City UT 84102
Richard C Henriksen Jr, Esq
320 S 500 E
Salt Lake City UT 84102
Kristy Bertelsen Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Mark Dean Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Elliot K Morris Esq
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Nancy E Boling.
Adjudication Division
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KAREN S WOOD,
Petitioner,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR REVIEW

vs.

Claim No.: _JVOO

IHC BRYNER CLINIC,

Case No. 01-1138

—

\ ~ 6 ^ Z\°[

Scan Into Legal
Respondent.

IHC asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Eblen's award of
benefits to Karen S. Wood under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter
3, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Ms. Wood filed an application for hearing on November 2, 2001, to compel IHC to pay
occupational disease benefits for latex allergy caused by her employment at IHC. Ms. Wood and
IHC waived their right to a hearing, submitted stipulated facts, and agreed that a medical panel
should consider the medical aspects of Ms. Wood's claim. The medical panel submitted its report on
January 20, 2004. In a decision issued June 21, 2004, Judge Eblen accepted the medical panel's
report, held IHC liable for a part of Ms. Wood's latex allergy and awarded benefits accordingly. IHC
then requested Commission review of Judge Eblen's decision on the grounds that the decision
incorrectly applied various provisions of the Act in computing IHC's liability.
FINDINGS OF FACT
As relevant to the issues raised in IHC's motion for review, the Commission makes the
following findings of fact, based on the parties' stipulated facts and the medical panel's report. The
Commission also adopts Judge Eblen's findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this
decision.
Ms. Wood suffers from an 11% whole person impairment. Of this 11% impairment, 8% is
from work-related latex allergies. The remainder is from Ms. Wood's underlying asthmatic/allergic
condition which is not work-related. Ms. Wood has limited her occupational disease claim to
disability and medical expenses for her latex allergy.
Ms. Wood's work-related latex allergy arose during a 15 year period when Ms. Wood was
injuriously exposed to latex products while employed at various health care facilities. This

—
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employment included clinics in Georgia and Wyoming and ended with her employment by IHC
from September 1992 until December 1997. In addition to her work-related exposure to latex, Ms.
Wood also experienced some exposure from her non-work environment.
Prior to January 16,1995, IHC was insured for occupational disease liability by the Workers
Compensation Fund. After that date, IHC was self-insured.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Because IHC contends that Judge Eblen erred in application of the Occupational Disease
Act's provisions for assessing and computing liability in this matter, the Comnriission will apply the
relevant provisions of the Occupational Disease Act on a step-by-step basis.
Section 34A-3-103 of the Occupational Disease Act defines "compensable occupational
disease" as "any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and is medically
caused or aggravated by that employment." The undisputed facts establish that Ms. Wood's
employment brought her into contact with latex and that this exposure medically caused or
aggravated her latex allergy. Ms. Wood's latex allergy is, therefore, a compensable occupational
disease.
Section 34A-3-110 of the Act1 establishes an apportionment formula that must be applied to

Section 34A-3-110, "Occupational Disease Aggravated By Other Diseases" provides as
follows:
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease,
or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
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occupational disease claims when any one of four criteria set out as §34A-3-l 10(1) through (4) is
met. The Commission notes that §34A-3-l 10 is poorly drafted and difficult to apply. Nevertheless,
Ms. Wood's claim meets subsections (1) and (2), in that her latex allergy is causally related to
employment with non-Utah employers and is causally related to non-work exposures to latex.
Therefore, under the operative provisions of §34A-3-l 10, Ms. Wood's compensation must be limited
to the proportion that "the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of the
disability.. . ."
In applying this formula, it is important to note that Ms. Wood's claim is limited to her latex
allergy. By the same token, it is only Ms. Wood's latex allergy which is the "occupational disease"
under consideration. Therefore, applying the statutory language of § 110 to the circumstances of this
case, the Commission concludes that Ms. Wood's occupational disease (latex allergy) is the entire
cause of the disability at issue. Consequently, §34A-3-l 10 imposes no reduction to Ms. Wood's
occupational disease benefits for her latex allergy and she is entitled to permanent partial disability
compensation for the entire 8% latex allergy impairment, as well as medical expenses necessary to
treat that allergy.
Having concluded that Ms. Wood is entitled to medical benefits and disability compensation
based on an 8% impairment, the Commission now turns to the question of whether IHC is liable for
the full amount of those benefits. That question is controlled by §34A-3-105 of the Occupational
Disease Act:
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational
disease which arises out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more
than one employer, the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease
if:
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was
a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive
months.
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability,
death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between employers

(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.
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Applying the foregoing statute to the facts of this case, Ms. Wood's latex allergy arose during
her employment in several health care facilities over a period of 15 years. The last of these facilities
was IHC, where she worked for approximately 5 years. Her employment at IHC, with the exposure
to latex that went with it, was a substantial contributing cause of her latex allergy. Consequently,
under the provisions of §105, IHC, as a self-insured entity, is liable for the entire amount of Ms.
Wood's compensation and medical care.
ORDER
In light of the. foregoing, the Commission modifies Judge Eblen's Order as follows:
Commencing February 28, 1998, IHC shall pay to Karen S. Wood permanent partial
disability compensation at the rate of $310 per week for 25 weeks, based upon Ms. Wood's 8%
whole person impairment from latex allergy. IHC shall also pay Ms. Wood interest at 8% per annum
on any of the foregoing disability payments that were not paid when due.
IHC shall also pay the reasonable expense of medical care necessary to treat Ms. Wood's
latex allergy, in accordance with the Labor Commission's medical fee schedule.
From the total amount of disability compensation and interest due Ms. Wood, IHC shall
withhold 20% and pay that amount directly to James E. Seaman as his fee for serving as Ms. Wood's
attorney in this matter.
It is so ordered.
Dated this JT

day of February, 2005.

R. Lee Ellertson
Commissioner

id&ensL

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Karen S Wood, Case No. 20011138, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ]Y_ day of February,
2005, to the following:
KAREN S WOOD
BOX 313
HANCOCK ME 04640
IHC BRYNER CLINIC
745 E 300 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
RICHARD C HENRIKSEN JR, ESQ
320 S 500 E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
MARK D. DEAN ESQ
257 E 200 S STE 800
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
ELLIOT K MORRIS ESQ
P O BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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U.C.A. 1953§34A-3-105
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE
CHAPTER 3. UTAH OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general

election.

§ 34A-3-105. Last employer liable—Exception
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational disease which arises
out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more than one employer, the only employer liable
shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the
disease if:
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was a
substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive months.
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability, death, and medical
benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the involved employers' causal contribution to the
occupational disease.
Laws 1991, c. 136, § 18; Laws 1996, c. 240, § J95, eff. July 1, J997; Laws 1997, c. 375, § 153, eff July 1, 1997.
Codifications C 1953, §§35-2-105, 35A-3a-105.

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
REFERENCES
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Workers' Compensation ^ ^ 2 0 1 , 551.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 413k201; 413k551.
C.J.S. Workers' Compensation §§ 120, 125 to 127, 322 to 323.
ANNOTATIONS
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Computation of period of limitations 4
Construction and application 1
Length of employment or exposure 2
Successive insurers 3
*19220 Sufficiency of evidence 5
1. Construction and application
Occupational Disease and Disability Act does not implicitly grant Industrial Commission discretion to interpret 1988 Last
Injurious Exposure Rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-2-1 et seq., 35-2-14. Luckau v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840
P.2d 811, certiorari denied 853 P.2d 897. Statutes <2X=>219(9.1)
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Amendment to Occupational Disease Disability Act, providing that exposure to hazardous substance must be substantial
contributing medical cause of disease and that employee must have been employed at least 12 consecutive months by employer in
order to be compensated, was not merely explanatory clanfymg amendment, but rather substantively changed Last Injunous
Exposure Rule U C A 1953, 35-2-14, 35-2-105 Luckau v Board of Review of Indus Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840 P 2d 811,
certioian denied 853 P 2d 897 Workers' Compensation <§^73
2. Length of employment or exposure
Pnoi veision of Last Injurious Exposure Rule encompasses all situations in which employee is exposed to material or
substances which contribute to illness from which employee suffers or which caused employee's death, in amount sufficient to have
caused or contnbuted to any degree to that condition, any exposuie which did contribute or could have contributed to condition is
sufficient U C A 1953, 35-2-13(b), 35-2-14 Luckau v Board of Review of Indus Com'n of Utah, 1992, 840 P 2d 811, certiorari
denied 853 P 2d 897 Woikers' Compensation <2^201
Statute limiting liability for silicosis to employer in whose employment employee was last exposed to hdimful quantities of dust
during period of 30 days requires only employment throughout 30-day period with harmful exposure during period, but does not
require actual woiking or actual exposure each day of period U C A 1953, 35-2-14 State Ins Fund v Industrial Commission,
1964, 16 Utah 2d 50, 395 P 2d 541 Workers' Compensation <£=>201
*19221 3. Successive insurers
Where miner's employer was self-insured during miner's employment and exposure to silicon dioxide until December, 1961,
when Insurance Fund took over, and miner who had been laid off in June, 1961, was recalled by same employer for seven days until
February 8, 1962, during which he was subject to same exposure, the employer and hence the Insurance Fund were liable under
statute pioviding that only employer liable should be employer m whose employment employee was last exposed during period of
30 days or moie U C A 1953, 35-2-14 State Ins Fund v Industrial Commission, 1965, 16 Utah 2d 269, 399 P 2d 208 Workers'
Compensation <§^=>1074
Under Occupational Disease Act providing that in case of silicosis only employer liable shall be the employer in whose
employment employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, the insurance carrier at time of employee's last
exposure to silicon dioxide dust was required to pay the compensation award, notwithstanding such carrier was no longer carrier at
time of employee's disability from sihco-tuberculosis Utah Code 1943, 42-la-l et seq , 42-la-12, 42-la-29, 42-la-13(a) (3),
42-1 a-14, 42-la-49(a) Pacific Emp Ins Co v Industrial Commission of Utah, 1945, 108 Utah 123, 157 P 2d 800 Workers'
Compensation c§^=>1074
4. Computation of period of limitations
Widow of insulation mechanic who died more than three years fiom last date on which he actually woiked for employer with
whom he was injuriously exposed to asbestos was not entitled to death benefits under Occupational Disease Disability Law
U C A 1953, 35-2-13, 35-2-13(b)(4), 35-2-14 Tisco Intermountain v Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1987, 744 P 2d 1340 Woikeis'
Compensation ^ ^ ^ 1280
5. Sufficiency of evidence
* 19222 Evidence in proceeding for compensation for silicosis and tuberculosis supported findings that claimant had been
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust in state for five of last fifteen years piecedmg disablement, had been exposed to
haimful quantities of dust after State Insurance Fund policy became effective, and had been exposed to haimful quantities for thirty
separate days during month when policy was effective U C A 1953, 35-2-1 et seq , 35-2-13(a)(3) State Ins Fund v Industrial
Commission, 1964, 16 Utah 2d 50, 395 P 2d 541 Woikers' Compensation <£^1509
In proceedings by underground miner under the Occupational Disease Statute to recover compensation for silicosis, evidence
sustained finding of Industrial Commission that miner was injuriously exposed to silicon dioxide dust for statutory period while
working foi mining company U C A 1943, 42-la-14 Commission of Finance v Industrial Commission, 1952, 121 Utah 83, 239
P 2d 185 Workers'Compensation <S^ 1509
Evidence suppoited findings that claimant was exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for period of five years
between September, 1935, and July, 1946, that exposure occuned while employed by objecting employer, and that claimant left
employment in 1946 in consequence of total disability from silicosis, so as to justify award under the occupational disease disability
compensation law
U C A 1943, 42-la-13a(3), 42-la-14
Kennecott Copper Corp, Utah Copper Division v Industrial
Commission, 1949, 115 Utah 451, 205 P 2d 829 Woikers' Compensation <§^>1530
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Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election.
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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U.C.A.1953§34A-3-110
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE
CHAPTER 3. UTAH OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT
Current through Nov 2, 2004 general

election

§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the proportion of the
compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of disability or death, as
the occupational disease as a causative factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the
occupational disease, or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure outside of employment
or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged,
accelerated, or m any way contributed to by an occupational disease.
Laws 1991, c 136, § 22, Laws 1996, c 240, § 200, eff July 1, 1997, Laws 1997, c 375, § 158, eff July 1 1997
Codifications C 1953, §§ 35 2-109, 35A-3a-110

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

REFERENCES
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Workers' Compensation <§^>547, 552 to 566, 845
Westlaw Key Number Searches 413k547, 413k552 to 413k566, 413k845
C J S Workers* Compensation §§ 315 to 316, 320 to 321, 324 to 337, 549 to 551

Current through Nov 2, 2004 general election
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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• Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 157 P. 2d 800
(Utah 1945)
• Ballatore v. Buehner Block, et. al.
Labor Commission Case No. 020124 (05/18/04).

157 P 2d 800, 108 Utah 123, Pacific Emp Ins Co v Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah 1945)
*800 157 P 2d 800
108 Utah 123
Supreme Court of Utah
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INS. CO. et al.
v
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al.
No 6768
April 17, 1945
Original proceeding m certiorari by the Pacific
Employeis Insmance Company and the National
Tunnel & Mines Company to review an award of
compensation to John Deza by the Industrial
Commission of Utah, wherein the State Insurance Fund
was made a defendant
Award against the National Tunnel & Mines
Company, employer, affirmed, and award against
Pacific Employers Insurance Company annulled
West Headnotes
Workers' Compensation G^ 1074
413 —
413X1 Insmance and Public Funds
413XI(D) Private Insurance
413k 1074 Successive Insureis
Under Occupational Disease Act providing that in
case of silicosis only employer liable shall be the
employei in whose employment employee was last
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust,
the insurance carriei at time of employee's last
exposure to silicon dioxide dust was required to pay
the compensation awaid, notwithstanding such carrier
was no longer carriei at time of employee's disability
from silico-tuberculosis Utah Code 1943, 42-la-l et
seq, 42-la-12, 42-la-29, 42-1 a-13(a) (3), 42-1 a-14,
42-la-49(a)
*801 Charles Welch, Jr, of Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs
Giover A Giles, Atty Gen, and F A Tiottier, of
Salt Lake City, foi defendants
TURNER, Justice
Certioran to the Industiial Commission to review
an award of compensation to John Deza who became
totally disabled to woik on March 25, 1944, aftei
conti acting silico-tubeiculosis, withm the meaning of
the Occupational Disease Disability Compensation Act
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(Sec 42-la-l et seq, UCA1943), which act took
effect July 1, 1941
The facts, [108 Utah 124]
established without dispute m the lecoid, are that Deza
for 27 1/2 yeais during the period fiom 1914 to Maich,
1944, was employed by the National Tunnel & Mines
Company and its predecessor m interest, Utah-Apex
Mining Company
Continuous employment by the
mining companies named as an actual underground
miner up to June 7, 1943, was interrupted by
approximately 2 1/2 years' employment from 1920 to
1923 by the Paik-Utah Mines at Park City, Utah, and
the Utah Copper Mining Company at Bingham Utah
Testimony of Dr Paul S Richards, one of the
applicant's several attending physicians, shows that the
first record on the applicant dates back to 1932, that
the first positive diagnosis of silicosis was made March
10, 1937, on clinical findings, and the first positive Xray findings weie made December 28, 1939, resulting
m a diagnosis of silico-tuberculosis
Applicant's
piogressive condition, shown by these diagnoses, did
not result in actual disability to perform his work,
except an occasional lay-off on account of sickness
On advice from the doctor, however, Deza left
underground mining on June 7, 1943, and remained m
the Company's employ as a watchman above the
giound from then until March 25, 1944, on which date
he definitely ceased working and was later confined as
a continued bed patient in the hospital On April 20,
1944, stereoscopic X-rays were again taken when a
confirmed diagnosis of silico-tuberculosis was made
and fiom an X-ray standpoint the tubeiculosis was
considered as active The first positive sputum was
found on May 19, 1944
Fiom the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen that
the last actual exposure to silicon dioxide dust was
June 7, 1943 The significant importance of this date
will become appaient immediately Prior to July 1,
1943, the workmen's compensation and occupational
disease insurance was carried by the National Tunnel
& Mines Company with the State Insmance Fund On
and aftei July 1, 1943, the Mines Company insurance
earner was the Pacific Employers Insmance [108 Utah
125] Company for liability undei both acts, and by
Provision VII of its policy of insmance it was piovided
that This agieement shall apply only to such injuries so
sustained by reason of accidents occurring during the
Policy Penod limited and defined as such m Item 2 of
said Declaiations' Item 2 of the Declaration sets out
that the policy penod 'shall be fiom July 1, 1943, to
July 1, 1944'
We here quote a few pertinent provisions of the
state (UC A 1943)
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Sec 42-la-49

Silicosis-Defmed
Toi the purpose of this act
'silicosis' is defined as a chronic disease of the lungs
caused by the piolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide
dust (SiO sub2 ) chaiactenzed by small disciete
nodules of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated
throughout both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray
pettem, and by variable clinical manifestations '
Sec 42-la-12
'The following terms as used m this act shall be
construed as follows
'(a) 'Disablement' means the event of becoming
physically incapacitated by reason of an occupational
disease as defined m this act from performing any work
foi remuneiation or profit Silicosis, as defined in this
act, when complicated by active pulmonary
tube? culosis, shall be presumed to be total disablement
'Disability,' 'disabled,' 'total disability' or 'totally
disabled' shall be synonymous with 'disablement"
Sec 42-la-14
'Where compensation is payable for an
occupational disease the only employer liable shall be
the employer m whose employment the employee was
last mjuiiously exposed to the hazards of such disease,
pi ovided that in the case of silicosis the only employer
liable shall be the employei in whose employment the
employee was last exposed to haimful quantities of
silicon dioxide (SiO sub2 ) dust dining a penod of
*802 sixty days oi more aftei the effective date of this
act'
Sec 42-la-13
'(a) There is imposed upon every employer a
liability foi the payment of compensation to every
employee who becomes totally disabled[108 Utah 126]
by reason of an occupational disease subject to the
following conditions * * *
'(3) No compensation shall be paid in case of
silicosis unless during the ten years immediately
preceding the disablement the injured employee shall
have been exposed to harmful quantities of silicon
dioxide (SiO sub2 ) dust for a total period of not less
than five years m this state and unless total disability
results withm two years from the last day upon which
the employee actually worked for the employer-agamst
when compensation is claimed '
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'The right to compensation under this act foi
disability oi death from an occupational disease shall
be forever barred unless written claim is filed with the
commission withm the time as m this section
hereinafter provided
'(a) If the claim is made by an employee and based
upon silicosis it must be filed withm one year after the
cause of action arises * * *'
On May 22, 1944, Deza filed application with the
Commission setting forth the nature of his total
disability and its cause as hereinbefore stated Upon
this application and the answer of the Pacific
Employers Insuiance Company denying liability, and
after the State Insurance Fund was made a party to the
proceeding, the case was duly heard before the
Commission and a decision was made and filed July
11, 1944 In its decision, the Commission found the
facts to be substantially as set out at the beginning of
this opimon, and held the National Tunnel & Mines
Company and the Pacific Employers Insuiance
Company liable for the statutory compensation,
hospital and medical expense, and dismissed the
application as against the State Insurance Fund
In the course of its decision, the Commission holds
'We cannot give any weight to the argument of
defendant, Pacific Employers Insurance Company that
applicant was not exposed to haraiful quantities of free
silicon dioxide dust since July 1, 1943, the date when
Pacific Employeis Insurance Company became the
insurance carrier
We think the lecord shows
conclusively that applicant! 108 Utah 127]
was
exposed to hamrful quantities of fiee silicon dioxide
dust for not less than five years out of the last ten years
immediately preceding his disablement, and that he
was likewise exposed for more than sixty days since
the effective date of the act, July 1, 1941 If this is
true, then legardless of the fact that the disability
occuned after Pacific Employers Insuiance Company
became the insurance carrier, the same employer is
involved thioughout the entue period fiom 1934 to
March 25, 1944, and theiefoie the question of
insuiance camei is nnmateiial The National Tunnel
and Mines Company was the first and last employer so
far as we are concerned, and since the claim of
applicant was filed will withm the time specified by the
statute of limitations the employei is unquestionably
liable, and the insurance carrier which happens to be
the msuier at the time the total disability occurs must
assume liability, although the exposme occuned prior
to the effective date of the policy, and although the
to original U S Govt woiks

157 P 2d 800, 108 Utah 123, Pacific Emp Ins Co v Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah 1945)
disease which finally caused total disablement existed
pnoi to the date of the said policy' (Italics added )
The Commission's findings and award of
compensation m favor of Deza against the National
Tunnel & Mines Company as employer are amply
supported by the recoid and there can be no dispute as
to this portion of the Commission's decision The
questions raised with merit m this court on review
i elate solely to whether the Pacific Employers
Insurance Company or the State Insurance Fund is
liable as insurance carriei under the peculiar facts of
this case
It is our opinion that the Commission erred m
holding the Pacific Employers Insurance Company
liable It is true that the applicant's total disability did
not occur until Maich 25, 1944, but the cause of his
ultimate disability had been m operation for many
years prior to that date The statute plainly piovides
'that m the case of silicosis the only employer liable
shall be the employei m whose employment the
employee was last exposed to haimful quantities of
silicon dioxide (SiQ sub2 ) dust during a period of sixty
days or more after the effective date of this act [July 1,
1941]' Under the facts, the statutory requnements
*803 weie all clearly met and render the National
Tunnel & Mines Company [108 Utah 128] liable as
such last employer As has been pointed out, however,
June 7, 1943, was the date of the last exposure of the
applicant to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust,
and from that date until his employment ceased
because of total disability on March 25, 1944, he
continued in the employ of the Mines Company but m
the capacity of a watchman above ground on the
property of the Company The insurance carrier at the
time of such last exposure was the State Insurance
Fund, this is the date which fixes the liability of the
employer, and consequently also attaches the liability
to the employer's msuiance earner as of that date, and
upon the whole lecord and from the clear wording of
the statute, the decision of the Commission should have
held the State Insmance Fund liable for the payment of
the compensation awarded
Many cases aie cited by both parties, none directly
m point but many helpful m pimciple, and we deem it
only necessary m support of our decision to quote the
following fiom Case of Anderson, 288 Mass 96, 192
N E 520, 521, cited m plaintiffs bnef The fact that
the employee continued to work for a short time after
the cause of his incapacity became complete did not as
matter of law lequire a finding that his mjmy did not
occm until, because of incapacity, he ceased woikmg
Personal injury and incapacity for work aie not
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equivalent terms and incapacity foi work which is the
final result of injury does not necessarily begin when
the injury occurs Case of Can oil, 225 Mass 203, 207,
114 N E 285 Cases m which it has been held that the
boaid was warranted m taking the date incapacity
began as the date of the injury aie cases where there
was no finding of the exact date of the injury
(Atamian's Case, 295 Mass 12, 16, 163 N E 194) or
where there was evidence that the cause of the injury
was cumulative, as here, and, furthermore, that the
employment continued to be a contributing cause of
such injury up to the date incapacity began See In re
Johnson, 217 Mass 388, 104 N E 735, Case of
Bergerson, 243 Mass 366, 137 N E 739, Case of
Johnson, 279 Mass 481, 181 N E 761 Where, in the
case of a cumulative cause ofinjwy theie has been a
change of insure?, it has been deemed essential that
the employee, in oidei to establish the liability of the
latei insui ei to pay compensation, pi ove the existence
of a causal relation between the [108 Utah 129]
employment during the penod coveied by its policy
and the employee's injwy
Case of Fabnzio, 274
Mass 352, 174 N E 720, Case of Langford, 278 Mass
461, 463, 180 N E 228, Case of De Fihppo, 284 Mass
531, 534 [188 N E 245] The implication is that
where no such causal ielation exists the employee's
injury which results in his incapacity is to be legaided
as having occuri ed pi wi to that penod and not at the
date incapacity began ' (Italics added )
Applying this leasonmg to the instant case, it
cannot be said that theie was any causal relation
between applicant's disability due to sihco-tuberculosis
and his employment duung the policy period of the
Pacific Employers Insurance Company as insurance
carriei
The award of the Commission as against the
employer, National Tunnel & Mines Company, is
affirmed, and as against the Pacific Employers
Insurance Company the award is annulled
LARSON, C J , and McDONOUGH and WADE,
JJ
WOLFE, Justice
I concui I desire, however, to refer to the case of
Continental
Casualty
Company v
Industrial
Commission, 63 Utah 59, 221 P 852
The case
involved a dispute between two insurance companies
as to which of them should pay a compensation award
enteied by the Industiial Commission
The facts
showed that one Sabey, while employed by Royal Coal
Company, was injmed on July 18, 1922
The
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157 P 2d 800, 108 Utah 123, Pacific Emp Ins Co v Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah 1945)
insurance carrier for the employei at the time of this
injury was the Aetna Life Insurance Company While
still employed by Royal Coal Company on Decembei
4, 1922, the employee, Sabey, was again disabled At
the date of the Decembei disability the employer's
insurance carrier was the Continental Casualty
Company Upon the recoid made we concluded that
the December disability was a recurrence of the July
injury The Commission had ordered the Continental
Casualty Company, the insurance carrier at the time of
last disability, to pay the award We reversed holding
that the Commission exceeded its authority *804. m so

Page 4

ordering, even though the same employei
primarily liable for both disabilities

was

While this case is not directly in point, it does hold
that in workmen's compensation cases, it is the
insurance carrier at the time of the accidental injury
which must pay the award even though said carrier did
not carry the insurance at the time of the disability
This is partly analogous to our holding that the
insurance carrier at the time of the last exposure must
pay the award even though it is not the carrier at the
time of the disability
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S.H.B. v. Buehner Block

Issued: 05/18/04

Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF") and Fremont Insurance Group, workers'
compensation insurance carriers at different times for the Buehner companies, ask the Utah Labor
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Hann's award of benefits to S. H. B. under the
Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. '63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. f34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. B. suffers from silicosis/ caused by exposure to silica dust. He filed applications for
hearing during February and March 2002 to compel Buehner and two of its insurance carriers, WCF
and Fremont, to pay occupational disease benefits for his illness. On May 20, 2003, Judge Hann
held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. B.'s claim. On November 24,2003, Judge Hann granted benefits
to Mr. B.. Judge Hann declined to rule on WCF's and Fremont's relative liability for those benefits.
Fremont and WCF now request Commission review of Judge Hann's decision. Freemont
does not contest Mr. B.'s right to benefits, but contends the benefits should be paid by WCF,
Buehner's insurance carrier during the last period that that Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust while
employed by Buehner. For its part, WCF disputes Mr. B.'s right to payment of future medical care,
Alternatively, WCF argues that a medical panel should be appointed to consider the medical aspects
of Mr. B.'s claim.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge Hann's findings of fact, summarized below. The
Commission augments Judge Hann's decision with additional findings regarding 1) the source and
duration of Mr. B.'s exposure to silica dust and 2) WCF's insurance coverage of Buehner.
For most of the time between 1967 and 2002, Mr. B. worked for Buehner as a sandblaster.
During that same period, Mr. B. occasionally held other jobs. He was in the army from 1967 to
1970, worked as a salesman from 1995 to 1999 and was self-employed between September 2000 and
September 2001. Mr. B. returned to Buehner afinaltime during September 2001 and worked until
January 11, 2002, when the company went out of business.
Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust throughout his many years working Buehner. He was not
exposed to any significant silica dust from any other source. On January 22,2002, only eleven days
after his work at Buehner ended, Mr. B. underwent a lung biopsy that showed he had silicosis. Mr.
B.'s silicosis was caused entirely by exposure to silica dust at Buehner.
WCF provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for Buehner from 1998 through
January 2002.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Commission will first address Fremont's argument that WCF, rather than Fremont, is
liable for Mr. B.'s occupational disease benefits.
Fremont and WCF each provided workers' compensation coverage for Buehner during times
when Mr. B. was exposed to silica dust at Buehner. However, Fremont contends that, because WCF
was the insurance carrier when Mr. B. was last exposed to silica dust, liability for Mr. B.'s silicosis
falls entirely to WCF by virtue of the "last injurious exposure" rule.
The last injurious exposure rule places full liability on the insurance carrier covering an
employer at the time of the last injury or exposure that is causally related to the disability. See
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §153.02(1). With some limitations, § 34A-3-105 oftheUtah
Occupational Disease Act^ adopts the last injurious exposure rule, at least with respect to employers.
The question before the Commission is whether the last injurious exposure rule should also apply to
insurance carriers. On this question, the Commission sees no reason to deviate from the precedent
of Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 P.2d 800 (Utah 1945).
The facts of Pacific Employers are similar to the facts of Mr. B. 's case. Mr. Deza worked as
an underground miner for National Tunnel over a period of 27 years. He was diagnosed with
silicosis in 1937. He continued working underground, where he was exposed to silica dust, until
June 7,1943, when National Tunnel moved him to an above-ground position that d id not expose him
to silica dust. Three weeks later, on July 1, 1943, National Tunnel transferred its workers'
compensation insurance coverage from the State Insurance Fund to Pacific Employers Insurance Co.
On March 25, 1944, Mr. Deza became disabled from his silicosis and filed an application for
occupational disease benefits.
All parties conceded that Mr. Deza was entitled to occupational disease benefits, but each of
the two insurance companies that had provided occupational disease insurance coverage for National
Tunnel argued that the other was liable for payment of Mr. Deza's benefits. After citing § 42-la-14
of the Utah Occupation Disease Act (corresponding to the current § 34A-3-105 of the Act), the
Supreme Court concluded that the date on which Mr. Deza was last exposed to harmful quantities of
silica dust "attaches the liability to the employer's insurance carrier as of that date.. . " Because the
State Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier on June 7,1943, when Mr. Deza left the underground
mine and was no longer exposed to silica dust, the State Insurance Fund, rather than Pacific
Employers Insurance Co., was liable for all of Mr. Deza's occupational disease benefits.
While the Commission recognizes that the formulation of the last injurious exposure rule
now found in §34A-3-105 varies in some details from the version of the rule addressed in Pacific
Employers, those differences are not significant under the facts of Mr. B.'s case and do not undercut
the logic of the Pacific Employers holding.^ Therefore, having determined that Mr. B.'s last
injurious exposure to silica occurred at Buehner on January 11,2002, and that WCF was Buehner's
insurance carrier on that date, the Commission concludes that WCF is liable for all benefits due Mr.
4

B. and that Fremont has no liability.

Turning to WCF's motion for review, its primary argument is that WCF should have no
liability for future treatment of Mr. B.'s silicosis because any such future treatment will be
necessitated by his exposure to silica from sources other than his work at Buehner's. WCF's
argument lacks any evidentiary basis, but is instead based on conjecture. Of course, whether WCF is
required to pay future medical expenses will always depend on whether the then-available medical
evidence establishes that the medical care in question is necessary to treat Mr. B.'s work-related
silicosis. Subject to that clarification, the Commission finds no error in Judge Hann's award of
future medical care necessary to treat Mr. B.'s work-related silicosis.
WCF also contends a medical panel should be appointed to consider various aspects of Mr.
B.'s claim. WCF's argument is once again based on speculation, without reference to any statute or
rule that would require appointment of a medical panel under the facts of this case. Consequently,
the Commission declines to require appointment of a medical panel in this matter.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Hann's award of occupational disease benefits to Mr. B..
The Commission releases Fremont from any liability for such benefits and hereby orders WCF to
pay all disability compensation and medical expense due Mr. B. by virtue of Judge Hann's order. It
is so ordered.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2004.
R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
1. Silicosis is defined by Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27 ed., as: pneumoconiosis
due to the inhalation of the dust of stone, sand, or flint containing silicon dioxide, with formation
of generalized nodular fibrotic changes in both lungs.
2. Section 34A-3-105 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act sets forth Utah's version of the last
injurious exposure rule as follows:
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational
disease which arises out of and in the course of an employee's employment for more
than one employer, the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease
if:
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that employer was
a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 consecutive
months.
(2) Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for disability,

death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the
involved employers' causal contribution to the occupational disease.
3. The Commission also notes Professor Larson's comments regarding the continuing usefulness of
the last injurious exposure rule: "This rule . . . is the majority rule in successive insurer cases,
either by judicial adoption or by express statutory provisions." Larson's Workers'
Compensation Law, §153.02(1). 'The last injurious exposure rule is also utilized in
occupational disease cases, including those involving . . . silicosis . . . . The . . . rule is
particularly useful for allocating liability in occupational disease cases, which often involve a
number of insurers. " Larson's at §153.02(5)

4. In light of the Commission's conclusion that the last injurious exposure rule is applicable and
that WCF is the only insurance carrier liable for Mr. B.'s benefits, the Commission finds it
unnecessary to address Freemont's request to join other defendants.

